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Exchange rate policy and  
foreign exchange interventions in Poland 
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1 
1.  The evolution of the exchange rate regime in Poland 
Since 1990, Poland has adopted nearly all possible exchange rate regimes, moving smoothly from 
fixed peg to pure floating. At the beginning of the transition period exchange rate policy was aimed 
mainly at stabilising the economy. It supported monetary policy in its fight against inflation, playing the 
role of a nominal anchor. Under the stabilisation plan, the Polish authorities decided to fix the zloty to 
the US dollar at the level of 9,500 zlotys to one US$ in January 1990. In that way the government and 
the central bank delivered a strong nominal anchor for an economy facing dramatic and abrupt 
adjustments in the real sector and in relative prices. At the same time, the zloty became an internally 
convertible currency. 
The stabilisation plan assumed that the rate of 9,500 zlotys per US dollar would be valid for the first 
quarter of 1990 only. However, due to a positive current account balance in 1990 it was maintained 
much longer. Finally, in the environment of a very high inflation, the fixed peg resulted in excessive 
real appreciation and a loss of price competitiveness for Polish exports. In 1991, Poland faced 
significant deterioration in its trade balance and current account. As a policy response the zloty was 
devalued by nearly 17% in May 1991. In addition, the peg to the dollar was abandoned and the zloty 
was tied to a basket consisting of five currencies: the US dollar (45%), the German mark (35%), the 
pound sterling (10%), the French franc (5%) and the Swiss franc (5%). That currency composition 
roughly mirrored the composition of Polish foreign trade.  
The fixed exchange rate to the basket lasted until October 1991, when a pre-announced crawling peg 
system was implemented. It was supposed to constitute a compromise between the anti-inflationary 
policy and a reinforcement of the competitiveness of Polish goods on the international market. As the 
rate of inflation was higher than the rate of parity devaluation the real exchange rate was still 
appreciating. This entailed two further step devaluations, in February 1992 and August 1993.  
A breakthrough in exchange rate policy took place in May 1995, when the Polish authorities 
introduced a crawling band system. This was a very important step towards exchange rate flexibility 
(which culminated finally in the floating of the zloty exchange rate). It was preceded on the one hand 
by agreements on the reduction of the Polish debt with both the Paris and the London Clubs, and on 
the other hand by the liberalisation of foreign exchange regulations. The excessive inflow of foreign 
currencies put pressure on exchange rate appreciation and, as the administrative barriers to capital 
flows practically disappeared, the role of foreign exchange interventions in foreign exchange policy 
conduct increased rapidly. The zloty’s rate stuck to the lower limit of admissible fluctuations and 
therefore, in December 1995, the monetary authorities were forced to revalue the zloty. In 1998-1999 
the fluctuation bands were widened several times and finally, in April 2000, the zloty was formally 
allowed to float freely. That formal decision had been preceded by abandoning foreign exchange 
interventions in the market from 1998 and in 1999, closing transaction fixing with commercial banks. 
The floatation of the zloty had an important impact on currency risk and therefore reduced the 
susceptibility of the Polish economy to currency speculation. 
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2.  Exchange rate and eclectic monetary policy in the period 1990-1997 
The fixed exchange rate as a policy anchor determined the shape of monetary policy conducted in 
Poland in the period 1990-97, in which the National Bank of Poland was focused on the disinflation 
process. However, the actual disinflation path was not in line with the one officially targeted. The 
reason for this discrepancy lay to a large extent in the very procedure of setting the monetary policy 
targets in that period. The monetary policy guidelines defining the targets for every consecutive year 
were accepted in a resolution of the lower house of the Parliament (the Sejm). The Sejm usually 
changed the parameters projected by the NBP, including inflation targets and intermediate targets for 
broad money growth. In some years the Sejm set unrealistically low inflation targets. It was inspired by 
the distinct views of the Ministry of Finance, which could in this way achieve lower than planned 
deficits; higher inflation increased nominal budget incomes, whereas nominal expenditures were 
mainly fixed. That practice resulted in systematic overshooting of the inflation targets and unfavourably 
influenced the NBP’s reputation. 
 
Table 1 
Targeted and actual inflation in 1990-99
1 
Year  Target %  Actual %  Deviation % points 
1990 95.0  249.3  154.3 
1991 32.0  60.4 28.4 
1992 36.9  44.3  7.4 
1993 32.2  37.6  5.4 
1994 23.0  29.5  6.5 
1995 17.0  21.6  4.6 
1996 17.0  18.5  1.5 
1997 13.0  13.2  0.2 
1  Consumer Price Index, December to December. 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Nevertheless, the sustainable disinflation process was intact and still remained the main concern of 
NBP policy. At the same time, the NBP conducted its exchange rate policy, trying to moderate the 
appreciation of the zloty - initially mainly by administrative measures. After 1994, when the 
agreements with both the Paris and the London Clubs on Polish debt reduction were finally settled and 
the foreign exchange regulations liberalised, the importance of the administrative measures in foreign 
exchange policy conduct decreased considerably. Their role was taken over by the FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE interventions. The pre-announced devaluation pace was set lower than targeted inflation, 
so supporting gradual disinflation. Some tensions, however, were unavoidable as the efficiency of 
remaining exchange rate controls eroded with time. To depict the role of the exchange rate in the NBP 
approach it is useful to show the reaction to economic turbulences in 1995. 
In December 1994, the Sejm formulated two ambitious targets for the year 1995: 5% GDP growth and 
reduction in CPI inflation to 17% (from nearly 30% in 1994). Both parameters were exceeded: CPI 
inflation reached 21.6% and GDP growth 7%, what was mainly due to very rapid export growth. The 
bulk of that growth resulted from the dynamic development of cross-border trade with Germany, which 
was experiencing accelerating economic activity and had much higher price levels. The cross-border 
trade was mainly realised by individuals and small enterprises and, to a large extent, was 
unregistered. It could only be covered indirectly by official statistics, via recording of net purchases of 
foreign exchange cash by banks from bureaus of exchange. In response the zloty appreciated. As the 
profitability of the official exporting industries was low, further appreciation could have led to the 
elimination of a large group of exporting enterprises and a substantial loss of export markets 
(hysteresis effect). Under these circumstances the NBP decided to abandon the short-term target for 
inflation and to protect the zloty from further appreciation using sterilised interventions. The NBP was 
buying foreign currencies from banks, what inevitably led to growth in the liquidity of the banking BIS Papers No 24  257
 
sector. To absorb the increasing liquidity the NBP was conducting open market operations by selling 
its short-term bills. Huge foreign purchases, stemming from inflows from the surplus in the current 
account, accompanied by FDI and portfolio investment, generated an enormous increase in foreign 
reserves (US$ 9 billion within 12 months, what equalled a 140% increase in reserves).  
The assessment of that episode is open to debate. Some argue that keeping high interest rates and 
pursuing depreciation of the currency is contradictory in itself. In fact the Bank did not manage to keep 
entirely on course. Facing high foreign exchange inflows the NBP felt itself forced to widen the 
fluctuation band and finally to revalue the parity. Another strong argument is also put forward in the 
discussion: the NBP managed to protect the zloty from nominal appreciation (although only partly), but 
it failed to eliminate its real appreciation (Figure 1). It is, however, easy to notice that in the period in 
question a use of different deflators to calculate the real exchange rate leads to various outcomes. 
When the CPI is considered, strong appreciation results, whereas when other deflators (unit labour 
costs, export prices, PPI) are applied, stability or even depreciation of the real exchange rate is 
obtained (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 4 
Costs of open market operations 
 
The NBP was also criticised that its policy in 1995 contributed to imbalanced and unsustainable 
growth in the economy. A strong export-led recovery in 1995 translated into a consumption and credit 
boom in the following years. In late 1996, the current account deficit rose and started to grow at a very 
fast pace. High consumption was partly fuelled by expanding credit (in mid-1997 the dynamics of 
nominal credit to households exceeded 100%!). Last but not least, the fiscal cost of sterilised 
intervention was significant (Figure 4). It resulted from the amount of the liquidity surplus (absorbed in 
the open market operations) and the interest rate differential. 
On the other hand, however, there are also good arguments for a positive assessment of the NBP’s 
policy. First, it is rather obvious that without NBP action in 1995 the Polish economy would had faced a 
sharp nominal appreciation and - in an environment of sticky prices and wages - the response of real 
variables to that shock would not have been fast and perfect. Second, the external balance would 
have deteriorated much faster, bearing in mind that deeper appreciation in 1995 would have 
eliminated a large part of exporting industry. Moreover, that effect would have been long-lasting, as 
lost markets are very hard to regain. That would have deepened the risk of currency crises in the late 
1990s as the current account deficit rose very fast, reaching its peak at over 8% of GDP in the first 
quarter of 2000. Third, high, export-led economic growth in 1995 only triggered consumption boom, 
but the roots of that boom lay elsewhere - in a very low propensity to save and excessively optimistic 
expectations after a very long period of low consumption. To support that argument it is enough to 
mention that the policy of very high real interest rates was largely ineffective. The NBP used 
unconventional methods, such as collecting deposits directly from the public, to hamper expanding 
consumption. Fourth, excessive domestic demand in the late 1990s was triggered by lax fiscal 
policies, so that monetary action could have had only limited effects. 
All in all, whatever the assessment of the NBP’s approach in the mid-1990s, it is unquestionable that 
the policy of sterilised intervention was flexible and oriented in the long term at a gradual and 
sustainable disinflation. It was aimed at protecting still fragile economic growth and disinflation process 
from disruptive shocks in the exchange rate. At that time in the opinion of the NBP there was a risk 
that sharp appreciation in 1995 would have produced lower inflation in the short run, but would 
simultaneously have increased the threat of a currency crisis, with its high cost in GDP terms, and of a 
rebound in inflation.  
As the financial markets in Poland were developing very fast, the foreign exchange interventions 
appeared to be less and less effective. Until 1998 there were two episodes when the NBP managed to 
maintain the zloty on the devaluation path using foreign exchange interventions. In 1998, despite an 
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Abandoning of foreign exchange interventions and the de facto floatation of the zloty in 1998 resulted 
in a strong appreciation of the Polish currency, but in the context of a much stronger real economy that 
had been the case in the mid 1990s. Accordingly, although it was costly, the appreciation did not 
disrupt economic growth.  
3.  Exchange rate determinants under DIT 
Having liberalised capital flows, it is not possible to control both inflation and the exchange rate in the 
long run, which is a well known paradigm of the “impossible trinity”.
2 The NBP’s sterilised intervention 
policy was conducted in the environment of still developing financial markets and not a fully liberalised 
capital account of the balance of payments.
3 That was, however, not enough to avoid the limitations of 
the sterilised intervention policy. Even at a very early stage of financial development, in 1995, under 
the pressure of market forces the exchange rate regime had to be changed from a rigid crawling peg 
to a more flexible crawling band with widened fluctuation margins. A step revaluation of the central 
parity was also unavoidable. The pressure of the markets increased greatly in 1998, when a deep 
London-based NDF market for the Polish zloty suddenly developed. The NBP intervened massively in 
February and then in July 1998, buying on one record day over 0.5 billion US$ without any sustainable 
influence on the exchange rate. In response, the NBP stopped its interference in the foreign exchange 
market and the era of sterilised intervention was definitely over. 
In 1998, the newly established Monetary Policy Council (MPC) decided to change the monetary policy 
strategy of the NBP and introduced a direct inflation targeting (DIT) regime. Published in September 
1998, the “Medium-Term Strategy of Monetary Policy 1999-2003” set a medium-term inflation target of 
“below 4% by the year 2003”, and announced a gradual floating  of the exchange rate regime. The 
decision on future floatation of the zloty was a strategic one and was not related to the current market 
situation. According to the Strategy, monetary policy - as implemented until 1998 - could have not 
been continued in the new environment of advanced integration of the Polish financial markets with 
the global markets, coupled with lowering investment risk in Poland. As a necessary condition for 
effective implementation of a new direct inflation targeting regime the MPC recognised a further 
floating of the zloty was needed. The Strategy advocated a smooth evolution toward a floating 
exchange rate system to allow market participants enough time for preparation and to enable the 
exchange rate to be brought closer to its equilibrium level before the Polish currency entered ERM II. 
The official decision on floating was taken by the government and the MPC in April 2000. It was based 
on several arguments. First, the free float system is consistent with DIT strategy. Second, it constitutes 
a self-correcting device, acting as a shock absorber. Third, it extends freedom of monetary policy, as 
policy makers can increasingly concentrate on domestic developments when setting interest rates, 
paying less attention to international interest rates differentials. It is worth mentioning that de facto 
floating took place in mid-1998, when the NBP abandoned foreign exchange interventions, and was 
itensified in 1999, when it ceased organising so-called fixing operations with domestic banks. 
However, until April 2000, although the admissible fluctuation band of the zloty was very wide, the 
NBP still announced the central parity. It served as a benchmark for the market, which helped to 
stabilise the zloty’s exchange rate. After the floating, the volatility of the exchange rate increased 
significantly with resultant severe appreciation in the period 2000-01 and strong depreciation from 
2002 to mid-2004. 
The monetary policy conducted between 1998 and 2002 brought about the principal effect of reducing 
inflation from 13.2% in December 1997 to 0.8% in December 2002. The annual average inflation rate 
came down from 11.8% in 1998 to 1.9% in 2002, reaching the level observed in developed 
economies. The disinflation process was successfully ended.
4 It should be added, however, that some 
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other factors than monetary policy contributed as well to the achievement of that satisfactory result. 
They included disinflationary supply shocks in both food and fuel markets and slackening of Polish 
GDP growth, which was unavoidable within a deteriorating external economic environment.  
In February 2003, the MPC announced a new strategic document, “Monetary policy strategy beyond 
2003”, in which it introduced an ongoing inflation target of 2.5% CPI in year-on-year terms with a 
permissible fluctuation band of ±1 percentage point either side of this target. In the opinion of the 
MPC, the above-defined continuous inflation target is consistent with strong economic growth. At the 
same time, the redefined inflation target comes close to the expected reference value for the 
Maastricht inflation criterion. From 1998 to 2002, reference values remained between 1.8% and 3.4%, 
and 2.7% on average. Therefore, an inflation rate stabilised at the level of 2.5% does not guarantee 
that the inflation criterion is fulfilled. However, any subsequent attempts to adapt inflation to the 
reference level will not require a substantial reduction in the price growth rate in Poland over a short 
period of time. Having decided this, the MPC switched to a regular approach to monetary policy under 
the DIT strategy aimed at stabilising the inflation rate close to the ongoing target.  
The strategy of direct inflation targeting assumes abandoning intermediate targets, such as exchange 
rate management. Instead, the NBP reacts to any available information on factors influencing inflation, 
in particular developments which could jeopardise reaching the inflation target, including exchange 
rate movements. Thus, exchange rate volatility is one of the factors that may jeopardise reaching the 
inflation target. The zloty’s real appreciation/depreciation leads to future inflation decreases/increases, 
where the partial pass-through coefficient (ie assuming constant wages) is estimated at around 0.2.  
The exchange rate, therefore, constitutes a very important element of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. According to an estimate based on the quarterly macro-econometric model, ECMOD
5, 
used in the NBP, the path of the zloty’s real effective exchange rate depends on three factors
6: the 
long-term trend of the real exchange rate that hinges on fundamentals such as the real convergence 
measure and net foreign assets; real interest rate disparity between Poland and its main trading 
partners; the risk premium parameter.
7 
Consequently, tight monetary policy increases the interest rate disparity and thus leads to temporary 
overvaluation and hence to an inflation decrease. On the other hand, a lax interest rate policy causes 
an undervaluation of the domestic currency and an increase in inflation. According to estimates based 
on ECMOD, raising the base interest rate by one percentage point for six quarters leads to the zloty’s 
real appreciation by up to 1.5 % (after six quarters). This, in turn, accounts for about half of the fall in 
inflation that is estimated at about 0.3 percentage points in all.  
The modelling of the external sector is one of the key elements in preparing the inflation projection. 
The management board of the NBP approves the projection prepared by the staff for submission to 
the Monetary Policy Council, which is the most important input to the Monetary Policy Council’s 
decision-making process on interest rate setting. Under the floating exchange rate regime the central 
bank has considerable autonomy in setting its interest rates, which facilitates smoothing output and 
employment fluctuations, particularly when the economy is hit by asymmetric external demand shocks 
(or terms of trade shocks). 
According to NBP analyses, at present the pass-through effect in Poland is weaker than it used to be 
during the late 1990s. Even so, it still remains strong, and its changes across the business cycle 
require further examination. Nevertheless, there is no temptation to use the pass-through effect as a 
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where qt is the real exchange rate, while rt and rt* represent real interest rates. As a result one can decompose the current 
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policy tool. It would require employing the exchange rate as an intermediate target directly or in a form 
of MCI steering. There is broad evidence that having only one instrument, when it is the short-term 
interest rate, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to steer exchange rate changes smoothly. 
The MCI steering as a policy rule is also not an attractive alternative. Apart from technical problems 
with precise defining and computing of the MCI, the changes in the MCI level may send misleading 
signals for monetary policy conduct.
8 
To sum up, on the one hand, in the case of Poland the effectiveness of a floating exchange rate in 
neutralising shocks to the Polish economy is confirmed by numerous analyses and is also visible in 
ECMOD simulations. To illustrate this, let us consider the example of a negative asymmetric external 
demand shock. First, there is a fall in the volume of exports and a deterioration of the current account. 
Second, if the contagion effect is present then the risk premium increases. Third, lower domestic 
demand may prompt the monetary authorities to conduct a more expansionary policy.
9 All these three 
factors would lead to a real depreciation of the domestic currency, enabling a partially negative impact 
of the shock on the economy to be offset. This exchange rate adjustment mechanism occurred during 
the Russian crisis in August 1998, when the zloty depreciated by 8% within three days.  
On the other hand, however, a floating exchange rate may generate unwelcome shocks to the 
economy. For example, if investors’ perception of risk grows, the currency may depreciate without any 
changes in the economic fundamentals of a country. This may be illustrated by the 5% weakening of 
the zloty within a week in January 2003, due to disturbances in the Hungarian foreign exchange 
market (contagion effect). That is why the cost of abandoning the exchange rate after the 
euro-adoption tends to be overestimated, as the free float is not only a shock absorber but can be also 
a shock generator. 
The superiority of a floating exchange rate over a fixed one as a shock absorber is not a crucial 
argument for choosing the former. The floating exchange rate is consistent with the DIT strategy and 
its merits are prevail. Unlike exchange rate control, inflation targeting delivers a stable and reliable 
nominal anchor for the medium-sized economy. That is the decisive argument for the MPC’s 
declaration of willingness to maintain the float until ERM II mechanism adoption. 
4.   Conclusions 
Since 1990, Poland has adopted nearly all possible exchange rate regimes (except for a currency 
board), moving smoothly from fixed peg to pure floating. Notwithstanding some tensions that occurred 
during this period, Poland managed to avoid any serious turbulences in the foreign exchange market. 
That encourages one to draw lessons from that experience. 
First, the transition period is usually characterised by shallow financial markets and a fragile real 
sector. The eclectic policy conducted by the NBP was aimed at protecting the real sector from a shock 
appreciation of the domestic currency, with sterilised foreign exchange interventions as a main policy 
tool. Although that policy can still be debated, its results were rather encouraging during the period of 
economic transformation. 
Second, as financial markets developed, foreign exchange interventions appeared to be less and less 
effective. 
Third, a pure DIT regime was launched after a substantial period of gradual floating of the exchange 
rate, development of financial markets and growing productivity of enterprises. The gradual approach 
to floating the currency seemed to help economic agents to cope with higher volatility of the exchange 
rate and the episodes of severe appreciation. 
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Annex Table 1 
Exchange rate system history in Poland between 1990 and 2002 
Period  Exchange rate system  Characteristics 
Before 1990  Fixed rate against basket of currencies  Frequent and significant devaluations 
1/1/1990  Devaluation (46.2%), fixed against US dollar  Exchange rate as anti-inflationary anchor 
17/5/1991 Devaluation  (16.8%).  Fixed rate basket of five 
currencies 
Real appreciation and strong decline in 
competitiveness 
15/10/1991  System of crawling peg with monthly rate of 
devaluation levelled at 1.8% 
Attempt to reconcile disinflation objective and 
maintaining competitiveness of exporters on 
the world market 
25/2/1992 Devaluation  (12%)  Improved competitiveness 
27/8/1993  Devaluation (8%), monthly rate of devaluation 
1.6% 
Low level of foreign reserves and the 
reduction of inflation 
13/9/1994  Monthly rate of devaluation 1.5%  Tightening anti-inflationary policy 
30/11/1994  Monthly rate of devaluation 1.4%  Falling inflation 
15/2/1995 Monthly  rate  of devaluation 1.2%   
6/3/1995  Increase in fluctuation band for transactions 
NBP/banks to +/- 2% around NBP parity 
 
16/5/1995  Implementation of crawling band system, with 
fluctuation band amount +/- 7% 
Higher flexibility of the foreign capital inflow 
management 
22/12/1995  Revaluation of the zloty exchange rate (6%)  Increased inflow of short-term foreign capital 
8/1/1996 Reduction  of  monthly devaluation rate to 
1.0% 
Exchange rate policy subjected to inflation 
targeting 
25/2/1998 Reduction  of  monthly devaluation rate to 
0.8% 
Expanding fluctuation band to +/- 10% 
 
17/7/1998 Reduction  of  monthly devaluation rate to 
0.65% 
 
10/9/1998 Reduction  of  monthly devaluation rate to 
0.5% 
 
29/10/1998  Expanding fluctuation band to +/- 12.5%   
1/1/1999  New currency basket: 55% euro and 45% 
dollar 
 
25/3/1999 Reduction  of  monthly devaluation rate to 
0.8% 
Expanding fluctuation band to +/- 15% 
 
12/4/2000  Floating the zloty: adopting free-floating 
system 
Higher currency risk, lower opportunity of 
currency speculation 
Source: National Bank of Poland 
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